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ronmental background, intelligence, or emotional makeup.'
In
summary, the indeterminate sentence is an effort to "individualize"
punishment, to differentiate personalities and backgrounds, and to
apply the most appropriate corrective measure.12
CONCLUSION

Although the judgment is often a mere recital pronounced by the
judge, its effect is to give the trial court's authority to the jury verdict
and to bring the proceedings to an end. In addition, the judgment
is a valuable safeguard for the defendant and should be critically reviewed for error by the defendant's attorney.
The sentence is a penalty for misconduct and should also be reviewed by the defendant's attorney so that it will be imposed only in
accordance with the statute under which the defendant was convicted.
It is apparent that the indeterminate sentence is an effort to provide "individual" punishment for each criminal. To further this purpose the indeterminate sentence should be made mandatory by the
legislature. If this method of sentencing were adopted, it would relieve the trial judges of responsibilities which can be more effectively
performed by the parole commission.
DONALD L. GArns, JR.

CRIMINALS' LOSS OF CIVIL RIGHTS
Criminal procedure concerns itself primarily with securing justice
for the accused. The rights of the accused are accorded strict observation to the end that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. All too often, however, the prisoner, once
convicted, is no longer served by regular and uniform legal rights and
procedural guarantees. He is subject not only to deprivation of certain rights, but to a wide variety of penal theories. It is of singular
significance that comparatively little attention is devoted to penal
method and rights of prisoners generally in what might be termed
the field of law proper. These concerns have been, by and large,
111. Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, Fed. Prob., Dec. 1956, p. 15.
112. Ibid.
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within the province of the criminologist, the penologist, or the sociologist. The Florida legislature has, for the most part, acquitted itself exceptionally well in the area of correctional legislation.1 But the
status of the Florida law with reference to the deprivation and restoration of civil rights of criminals leaves something to be desired.
It will be the purpose of this note to examine the provisions of
Florida law with reference to the loss of certain rights upon conviction, to determine what purpose is served by such loss, and, further,
whether this purpose serves the best interests of justice.
It would be appropriate to begin, perhaps, by attempting to define civil rights. We are not here concerned with the rather loose
connotations presently attached to the term, namely the freedom from
discrimination and prejudice. Two basic categories of deprivations
result from criminal activity. First, certain basic rights are lost automatically upon conviction of a felony or certain other crimes. The
loss of these rights arises by operation of law and is a simple consequence of conviction. This category includes loss of such rights as
suffrage. Bights lost in this manner may generally be restored by pardon. A second category concerns what may be termed professional
privileges. In the latter instance criminal activity may subject the
convict to severe deprivations, but these deprivations rest in the discretion vested in a professional disciplinary agency. In this category
we find, for example, cases involving loss of the right to practice medicine because of a conviction for perjury, possession of stolen goods,
and grand larceny,2 or to practice law because of a conviction for aggravated assault.3 Pardon does not restore privileges lost here. Restoration in this area rests within the discretion of the professional
regulatory board. Although some highly refined distinctions are
made in the courts and there is some overlap between categories and
among the various statutory and constitutional provisions relative to
the loss and restoration of both rights and privileges, the distinctions
outlined above are basically recognized and will be of some help in
our inquiry.
Historically, loss of civil rights may be traced back to punitive
concepts prevalent among the Greeks and Romans.4 Under penal
1.
2.
3.
4.

See, e.g., the Florida corrections code of 1957, FLA. STAT. ch. 944 (1961).
Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1939).
Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935).
Banishment and reduction to the status of a slave were penal measures

resulting in loss of citizenship.

BARNEs & TEE-Tas, NEW HoMRZONS IN CaIMI-

802 (1947). In the Roman Republic the infamous status of having
been convicted of crime meant loss of the right to vote, to hold office, to represent another in the courts, to be a witness, to manage the affairs of another,
and the abridging of the right to marry. Surnara.M
& CPessEY, PiumcnLzEs or
Cr fINoLooY 267 (5th ed. 1955).
NOLOGY
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theories prevailing at ancient common law the proven criminal was an
outlaw and without legal rights. Attainder and its consequential corruption of blood extinguished all rights of the felon and worked intolerable hardship on his family.5 The development of concepts of
due process of law to protect those accused of crime did not substantially alter the nature of the punishment imposed upon those convicted. Though some reform has gradually come to alleviate the
earlier barbarism in the treatment of offenders, the changes have
occurred for the most part administratively, with little relation to conceptions of due process and rules of law. Although there is no doubt
that discretion should be preserved in proper places throughout the
administration of criminal corrections, this discretion should be set
within a framework specifically determined by law. "As in other
areas of governance," Professor Tappan has so aptly remarked, "we
have looked, often with dewy-eyed expectancy, to the expert, though
with great uncertainty in the field of corrections as to what constitutes
expertness. We have sought abstract, loosely defined goals, with a
minimum of direction or control by law over the authorities charged
6
with the treatment of the criminal."
SPECIFIC DEPRivATioNs IN FLoRmA

Our democratic society calls upon its members to exercise their
freedoms responsibly in many ways. Some of these freedoms are
found in the specific right of suffrage, the right to hold public once
and positions of trust, the right to be a witness in court, the right and
duty to serve as a juror, and the right to bear arms. In addition, certain professional positions of high social value, such as those of attorneys and physicians are clothed with special significance and require
the exercise of a particularly judicious sense of responsibility. All of
these rights and privileges are subject to forfeiture in Florida upon
conviction of certain crimes.
5. All of his property was forfeited and he could neither inherit, retain, nor
transmit property. In addition, offenders were branded or mutilated so that all
might know of their guilt and infamy. Loss of rank, mutilation of the body
after death, and other methods were employed to attribute infamy to the convict in the eyes of the public. SuTmLAm & COEssny, op. cit. supra note 4,

at 267.
6. Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 Annals 100 (1954). To say
that the convicted criminal's loss of rights is, for the most part, not a facet of
modem penal philosophy, but a residuary punitive measure engendered in a
bygone age, is not to say that the deprivation of certain rights may not fulfill
a valid purpose in modem penology. Subsequent examination of various penal
philosophies will presently reveal that such deprivations may be useful.
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Suffrage
The Florida constitution denies the right of suffrage to one convicted of a felony, and such denial remains effective until the offender
is "restored to civil rights."7 This constitutional provision is reiterated
in the Florida statute which sets forth the qualifications for registration.8 The statute provides that among those not entitled to vote are
persons "convicted of any felony by any court of record and whose
civil rights have not been restored" and persons "convicted of bribery,
perjury, larceny or any infamous crime in this or other states, or interested in any wager depending on the result of any election." This
deprivation is accomplished by the registrar's removing the convict's
name from the list of qualified electors. 9
In determining whether a person has been convicted of a felony as
contemplated by the provisions set out above, the definition to be applied is set forth in the Florida constitution. 10 This provision has been
construed to mean that a person convicted of a felony in the United
States District Court does not fall within the prohibition of the former
provision."' We must therefore turn to the statutory provision cited
above to see whether the right to vote may be lost by reason of a conviction of an infamous crime. In determining whether a crime is infamous, the real criterion is whether the offense is one for which an
infamous punishment may be awarded, that is, imprisonment in a
state prison or penitentiary, or if the conviction is for a felony in the
federal courts.' 2 In applying this criterion, however, the First District
Court of Appeal has recently held that the test is whether the crime, if
committed in Florida at the time of its commission in another jurisdiction, would have carried the infamous penalty in Florida.' 3 It appears, however, that conviction for the misdemeanor of petit larceny
disqualifies a person from voting.14 It is situations such as this which
point up the arbitrary aspect of the deprivation of civil rights presently existing in Florida. There seems to be no clear general standard
underlying the deprivation of rights concept.
7. FLA. CoNsT. art. VI, §4.
8. FLA.STAT. §97.041 (1961).
9. See [1951-1952] FLA. A'r'y GEN. BNAr&. REP. 101.
10. "The term felony, whenever it may occur in this Constitution or in the
laws of the State, shall be construed to mean any criminal offense punishable
with death or imprisonment in the State Penitentiary." FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §25.
11. Duggar v. State, 48 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1949). Although this case concerned deprivation of the right to sit as a juror, the Attorney General of Florida
has applied the principle announced therein to the right of suffrage. [19511952] FLA. Ar'y GEN. BnmrL REP. 203, 205.
12. [1951-1952] FL. A'rY GEN. Bna;rNL& REP. 203.
13. Gutterman v. State, 141 So. 2d 21 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
14. State ex rel. Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla. 267 (1881). This decision
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Right to Hold Public Office
A closely related deprivation is the loss of the right to hold public
office. 15 A conviction rendering a person unqualified to vote will have
this effect because such person will not be able to include in his oath
as a candidate for nomination that he is a "qualified elector of the
state" as required by Florida Statute 99.021.16 The Florida constitution further provides: 17
The Legislature shall have power to, and shall, enact the
necessary laws to exclude from every office of honor, power,
trust or profit, civil or military, with in the State, and from the
right of suffrage, all persons convicted of bribery, perjury, larceny or of infamus [sic] crime, or who shall make, or become
directly or indirectly interested in, any bet or wager, the result
of which shall depend upon any election . . . but the legal dis-

ability shall not accrue until after trial and conviction by due
form of law.
The legislature has executed this constitutional mandate.18 In the
opinion of the Attorney General of Florida, 19 however, the disability
herein contemplated is not finally disposed of until the conviction is
no longer subject to further court procedure on direct attack. The
deprivation of this right is, therefore, not effective until final disposition on appeal.
The Governor also has power to suspend any elected or appointed
officer not subject to impeachment for, among other things, the "commission of any felony." Any officer so suspended by the Governor
may be removed from office by and with the consent of the Senate. 20
Although we have no judicial construction of the word "commission,"
it has often been held that the Governor has the power and duty to
reinstate a public officer suspended by him on satisfactory evidence
that the charges against him are untrue. 21 Thus, the present situation
appears to contemplate suspension and removal of an incumbent
before trial and conviction of the offense attributed to him.
The legislature has provided: "Every office shall be deemed vacant in the following cases: . . . (7) The conviction of the incumwas approved in 1953 and is presumably still good law. [1953-1954] FA.
A-r'y Gm. BmNNmAL REP. 72.
15. FLA. CoNST. art. VI, §5; FLA. STAT. §99.021 (1961).
16. See [1959-1960] FLA. Ar'y Gr. Bi mNr.AL REP. 510.
17. FLA. CON T. art. VI, §5.

18. See FLA. STAT. §§112.01, 732.45(1) (1961).
19. [1959-19601 FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 510.
20. FLA. CoNST. art. IV, §15.

21. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kelley v. Sullivan, 52 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1951).
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bent of any felony, or an offense involving a violation of his official
oath."22 But the Florida Supreme Court has indicated in this instance
that, while an officer may be suspended for the conviction of a felony,
the office is not deemed vacant except upon conviction, and conviction is inoperative while the supersedeas is effective. 23 It seems highly
probable that the legislature meant for this provision to provide for
removal of public officers in circumstances of conviction wherein the
Governor has failed to exercise his power of suspension or the Senate
has not acquiesced in removing the officer pursuant to the suspension.
Another Florida statute provides strict forfeiture of office and permanent disqualification from holding public office, trust, or appointment under the constitution or laws of this state for accepting, request24
ing, or soliciting a bribe.
Legislation against subversive activities has made violation of certain statutes felonious. 2 5 An entirely separate statute has included in
the penalty to be assessed for such an offense the loss of the rights to
hold office or position of trust, to file or offer for election to any office,
and to vote in any election in this state.26 There is no provision for
restoration of these rights once forfeited, and presumably the deprivation is intended to be permanent, though there are no cases on this
matter.
Right to Serve as a juror
Another right lost by virtue of a felonious offense is the right to
serve as a juror.27 Here again the deprivation is closely associated
with voting rights and is effected by removing the offender's name
from the list of qualified electors. Jurors in Florida must be "duly
qualified electors." 28 The statute specifically provides that the right
may be regained when the person is "restored to civil rights." This
disqualification is taken a step further in section 40.07, however,
which provides that one "under prosecution for any crime" shall be
disqualified to serve as a juror unless restored to civil rights. 2 9 The
validity of this latter provision has not been challenged; and it has
been held that a juror was properly excused when he gave an affirmative reply upon being asked if he was under prosecution for a crime.30
22.

FLA. STAT. §114.01

(1961).

23. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 75 Fla. 674, 78 So. 673 (1918).
The effect of this holding is the same as that noted above in connection with
[1959-1960] FLA. Ar'y GEN. BumnL REP. 510.

24.

FLA. STAT.

§838.02 (1961).

25. See FLA.

26.

STAT. §§876.22-.31
FLA. STAT. §876.25 (1961).

27.

FLA.STAT.

28.

FLA.STAT. §40.01(1)

29.

FLA. STAT.

(1961).

See also FLA.

STAT.

§§876.29, .30 (1961).

§40.01(2) (1961).
(1961).

§40.07(1) (1961).

30. Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889).
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Statutory provisions abrogating the right to serve on a jury have been
upheld on the ground that Florida or any state has the power to prescribe the qualifications for the jurors who serve in its courts.3 ' In
construing these statutes, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that the previous conviction of a felony does not render the
convicted person incompetent to sit as a juror, but merely constitutes a
ground of challenge for cause. 32 The Florida Supreme Court has held
that where a juror who had been convicted of a felony and pardoned
was only asked whether he had been convicted, a negative reply
would amount to contempt of court, but -wouldnot disqualify the juror
33
from service.
Right to Serve as a Witness
Conviction of perjury renders a person incompetent as a witness in
any Florida court.34 The legislature has specifically provided that a
pardon shall not erase this incompetence.3 5 But following the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court, the legislature does not have the
power to infringe upon the pardoning power specifically granted to
the Board of Pardons by virtue of Florida constitution, Article 4, section 12.36 On the other hand, the court might analogize this incompetence to the loss of certain professional privileges. In such cases a
37
full pardon does not restore professional privileges.
Right to Bear Arms
By virtue of Florida Statute 790.23 it is unlawful for a felon to own
or to have in his care, custody, possession, or control any pistol, sawedoff rifle or sawed-off shotgun, unless he has been restored to civil
rights. This statute seems to involve a serious limitation on a right
secured to the citizen by our federal and Florida constitutions.3" AlSee, e.g., Duggar v. State, 43 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1949).
Ford v. United States, 201 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953).
Story v. State, 53 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1951).
FLA. STAT. §90.07 (1961).
FLA. STAT. §90.07 (1961).
See also Clark, Florida Penalty Provisions,
9 U. FLA. L. REV. 289, 290 (1956).
36. Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (1896). The Attorney General of Florida approved this reasoning in 1951. [1951-1952] FLA. ATr'Y GEN.
BnmNAL REP. 360. Although the disqualification in the Singleton case was
attributable to a conviction for larceny, and no case clearly on point in Florida
has been found, the court might construe the limitation upon the pardoning
power contained in Florida Statute §90.07 as repugnant to Article V, section 12,
Florida Constitution.
37. See Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48 (1935), in which a
pardon did not restore the right to practice law.
38. U.S. CoNsT. amend. II; FLA. CoNST. Decl. of Rights, §20.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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though its validity has not yet been attacked, it will no doubt be sustained on the ground that it presents a problem of balancing interests,
and other deprivations affect rights which are secured to the individual by constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, the weapons involved
in this deprivation are of a particularly noxious character.
Professional Privileges
There are a number of professional privileges subject to forfeiture
at the discretion of special administrative boards. Of these we will
here concern ourselves only with deprivations regarding physicians.
This selection is made purely for illustrative purposes, and the reader
should realize that numerous other professional rights may be lost by
reason of criminal conviction.
The Board of Medical Examiners is granted statutory authority to
discipline the holder of a license or other authority to practice medicine vhen the person has been convicted of a felony. 39 The purpose of
the statute is to discontinue the privilege to practice to those morally
unfit or to those who have lost sight of the high standards required of
medical practitioners.4 0 A pardon does not restore such privileges nor
does it exempt the convicted person from the operation of this statute. 41 The statute leaves revocation of the physician's license to the
discretion of the board, 42 and thus it is a powerful disciplinary tool.
In concluding this section some general observations should be
made. Aside from deprivation of the rights enumerated above, felons,
unless restored to civil rights, must register within forty-eight hours of
entering any county in this state; they must be fingerprinted, photographed, and must list the crimes for which they have been convicted,
place of conviction, sentence imposed, name, aliases, address, and
occupation. 43 This statute is probably intended to encourage application for restoration of civil rights, but it would appear that a more
effective and less embarassing method might be adopted. 44 We shall
presently examine the possibilities in this area.
An examination of several of the cases cited in connection with this
section reveals a sort of judicial hostility toward depriving persons of
these rights. Although the statutes providing for deprivation are upheld, the question does not generally come directly before the courts.
89. FLA. STAT. §458.12(1)(b) (1961).
40.
193 So.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Page v. State Board of Medical Examiners of Florida, 141 Fla. 294,
82 (1940).
Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1939).
See [1951-1952] FLA. ATr'Y GFa. BmNNLL REP. 575.
FLA. STAT. §775.13 (1961).
But of. Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18107.
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Typically these cases involve, for example, an appeal from a conviction of crime wherein the appellant-defendant contends that a juror
was disqualified. 45 The person who has actually lost the right is not
generally before the courts.
BESTOB TON OF Cvm BiGHTs

Restoration of civil rights in Florida is within the province of the
Board of Pardons. 46 The Florida constitution provides that the Board
of Pardons may "remit fines and forfeitures." This language was early
held to have given the board power to restore civil rights, and further, this power was held to be exclusive. 47 The constitutional provision is supplemented by a statute providing that a full pardon shall
restore all the rights of citizenship enjoyed by the prisoner before his
conviction. 48 The pardon board also has power to restore Florida civil
rights lost by virtue of a conviction in another state or in a federal
court.49 Any such pardon, however, does not restore professional
status lost by virtue of administrative action.5"
Most states utilize the device of pardon in the restoration of civil
rights, 51 even though there has been serious and well-founded criticism of such use of the pardoning power. Professor Tappan has
2
cogently argued:
In theory pardon is an act of executive clemency, to be used
sparingly where innocence has been shown subsequent to conviction or where some other injustice has been worked. But
since in many jurisdictions the pardoning power is often misused by the chief executive of the state as a substitute for parole, it does not make sense to restore civil rights either generally or by specific provision through the governor's pardon
and to withhold them from those released on parole or dis45. See, e.g., Dugger v. State, 48 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1949).
46. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §12. The pardon board in Florida is comprised
of the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Comptroller, the Attorney General,
and the Commissioner of Agriculture. A full or conditioned pardon may be
granted in Florida by a majority of the pardon board so long as the Governor
is in the majority. Thus, the Governor cannot grant a pardon alone, but he
may defeat a pardon by not voting for it.
47. Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (1896). This case has been
approved by the Attorney General of Florida, as noted supra note 36.
48. FLA. STAT. §940.05 (1961).
49. [1955-1956] FLA. A-r'y GEN. BwNuNLs REP. 199.
50. See, e.g., Page v. Watson, supra note 41.
51. See Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights, YEARDOOE OF THE
NATIONAL PROBATioN AND PAROLE AsSOCIATION 86, 96 (1952).
52. Id. at 97.
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charged at the expiration of sentence. The effect is to make
restoration a matter of gubernatorial leniency rather than a
considered policy of correctional rehabilitation. Other methods,
therefore, are needed to restore the offender to the normal
rights and duties of the citizen in the community.
Since 1944 California has provided a system of restoring rights
whereby the felon may apply for a certificate of rehabilitation after
satisfactory behavior during the parole period. The certificate restores most civil rights and is issued by the superior court.53 In New
York a similar certificate of good conduct may be granted by the parole board upon application of the offender after he has conducted
himself satisfactorily for five years following suspension of sentence,
release on parole, or termination of sentence. 54 These methods, however, have not been practicably efficient. Although offenders and citizens agree that loss of civil rights has palpably adverse consequences
to the offender, only one of 258 offenders questioned in a study in
New York had applied for a certificate of good conduct. A majority
did not want to be embarrassed by an investigation, while others indicated they had no knowledge of or did not know how to apply for such
a certificatet 5
Some jurisdictions provide for automatic restoration upon completion of sentence."6 But it is submitted that such a method of restoring
lost rights cannot be used effectively in conjunction with a conscientious program of correctional rehabilitation. Indiscriminate restoration might well lead to a reinvestment of rights in persons who are not
really worthy of them. The Florida legislature has vested certain limited discretion in the trial courts to withhold deprivation by providing
that the judge may place on probation a man who has been found
57
guilty without the necessity of actually having to adjudge him guilty.
Since disabilities arise upon conviction, and adjudication is necessary
for a valid conviction, such a person may be placed on probation without loss of rights. In any event loss of civil rights as a penalty should
be used with judicious dispatch. Great discretion ought to be accorded those charged with restoration of these rights in order to make
use of the deprivation as a tool of correctional rehabilitation.
53. CAL.PEN. CODE §§2600, 2601.
54. N.Y. ExEcunwvE LAw §242.

55. Wallerstein, Testing Opinion of Causes of Crime, 28 Focus 103 (1949).
According to this report, one man who was earning $5,000 a year in a highly
skilled job stated: 'Idon't think I would lose my job if my employer found
out about my past. I do think it would prejudice my chance for promotion,
and if things become tough I will be laid off that much sooner. I have a
family, and can't afford to take a chance."
56. E.g., Wis. STAT. §57.078 (1962).
57. FLA.STAT. §948.01(1) (1961).
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It should be noted that under certain circumstances there are some
rights which may not be restored.r 8 Most statutes provide specifically
for restoration, but in the absence of such a provision the presumption
is that the deprivation is permanent.
PENAL THEORIES

One of the oldest theories of punishment is basic revenge. Society
has been harmed by the offender's unlawful act and seeks retribution
in the imposition of sentence. Though this method has received widespread condemnation at the hands of most writers, we must realize
that its use is not as infrequent as might be expected, and retribution
has its champions.5 0
Another theory is that punishment will deter a man from breaking
the law again and hopefully will provide an example to his fellows.
While this may work in some instances, it is far from universally effective. A distinguished business leader, who was discussing Bernard
Goldfine's indictment for evasion of $800,000 in income taxes, expressed some surprise to find Goldflne in such a fix. With the income
tax laws giving informants half of what is recovered in a suit to recover past taxes, the man should have known that someone would be
willing to turn him in for the reward. Can it be said that this distinguished businessman had not seriously or otherwise calculated the risk
of success or failure? He can hardly be said to have been deterred by
the example of Goldfine.30
Another function purportedly fulfilled by punishment is social protection. According to this view, society should utilize every instrumentality for self-protection against the destructive elements in its
midst.61 Incarceration prevents the criminal from preying on society.
But the often inescapable consequences to the prisoner personally may
result in a high price to society. The prisoner must at some time be
released if he does not die or is not executed. Today, with penal institutions overcrowded and expensive to operate, the tendency is to
release as many of these prisoners as may be practicable. The offender who is not placed on probation or granted a suspended sentence may be paroled in a relatively short time. Thus, the "protection" afforded society, even bearing in mind that a great number of
58. FLA. STAT. §838.02 (1961).

59. See HOLMES, TAE CONMON LAw 2-3, 42 (1928).
60. Francis & Johnson, Some Theories of Penology, SOCIOLOGY OF CRMM
257, 260 (Roucek ed. 1961).
61. Glueek, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HAv. L. IRxv. 453
(1928).
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crimes go undetected, is slight indeed. 62 It is the realization of this
situation which has most palpably forced society to consider what
manner of man will come out of the penal institution. Such consideration drives us strongly to urge that the released convict be rehabilitated.
The various methods of rehabilitation will vary from one individual
offender to another. Psychiatric help may be used effectively on most
willing prisoners; some prisoners learn a useful trade. But central to
the concept of rehabilitation is the restoration to human right and dignity. Such a restoration cannot be accomplished without a reinvestment of personal responsibility in the individual. Professor Tappan
feels that individuals discharged from correctional treatment should
generally be restored to the rights that they may have lost. He sees
the value of this as a symbol of the man's return to a non-criminal status and as a factor to facilitate rehabilitation. "Obviously," he continues, "there are certain limited risks involved in reviving these rights.
However, the state must always assume some risk in the very process
of releasing into the community men who have committed crimes
63
before and may do so again."
Prisons and prison routine would remove and stifle responsibility if
custody of the convict were their only function. Therefore, any correctional measures-suspension of sentence, probation, parole, pardon,
and incarceration-must not overlook the kinetic or potential existence
or non-existence of a sense of responsibility in the offender, but must
mold, reform, build, or rebuild this sense of responsibility as a basic
factor in the new man. Otherwise a high rate of recidivism must
naturally follow; for it is the exercise of responsibility which fosters
good citizenship. Rehabilitation should not force a man into a set
pattern of behavior whereby we may complacently examine him and
determine that he exhibits a "favorable attitude." A stereotyped mask
of behavior not only affords the hardened criminal a convenient way
out, but tends to choke off whatever seeds of responsibility may be left
in him. If a genuine sense of active responsibility were inculcated
into his personality, he could voluntarily become a valuable member
of society and preserve his individual dignity without having to masquerade as a "respectable" person. The "favorable attitude" concept
of rehabilitation, even if it met with the only kind of moderate success
of which it is capable, would not lead to individual freedom, but to a
new kind of bondage to external powers. Erich Fromm expressed
this idea in a slightly different context when he said that the "victory
of freedom is possible only if democracy develops into a society in
which . . . [the individual's] conscience and ideals are not the inter62. See RKcxI~ss, THE CRom PRoBar.
586 (3d ed. 1961).
63. TAPPAwr, ChMe, JUSTICE AND ComncwnoN 429 (1960).
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nalization of external demands, but are really his and express the aims
that result from the peculiarity of his self." 64 Among the philosophies
of punishment prevalent in modem society, we must recognize that
many of those in whose charge convicted offenders are placed go
about the discharge of their obligation with no clear penal objective in
mind. Professor Tappan has even gone so far as to state flatly that
"[T]he use of civil deprivations for purposes of punishment appears to
be both unnecessary and prejudicial to correctional goals."6 5 While we
may not agree with Professor Tappan, we should recognize that the
present use of loss of civil rights is not guided by a well considered
correctional goal, but rather seems the product of piecemeal legislation. If the legislature would adopt a standard objective of rehabilitation as outlined above, it would not only facilitate correctional administration, but it would provide a correctional framework within which
the deprivation of civil rights could serve a distinct and meaningful
function.
CONCLUSION

There seems to be no cogent reason why the Florida Parole Commission, or a similarly constituted organization, in cooperation with
the courts and penal authorities, should not be granted the power to
restore civil rights at any time. If such a scheme were adopted, the
restoration of civil rights could become an effective tool to be utilized
in the rehabilitation of the criminal. There is no need for a constitutional revision in order to effectuate this change, because there is
nothing in the constitution which holds the pardon board's power in
this respect to be exclusive. This construction was given to that section of the constitution in Singleton v. State.66 The rule of the Singleton case is the only thing standing between the present situation with
the restoration of rights exclusively within the power of the pardon
board, and a more sensible distribution of that power in accordance
with a legislatively adopted plan of correctional rehabilitation.
If the burden of using the pardoning power to restore civil rights
were removed, the Board of Pardons could fulfill its basic purpose,
namely, to temper justice with mercy and right the wrongs of the
machinery of justice. The Florida Parole Commission, trial judges,
and penal authorities are best suited to decide when and upon what
grounds lost rights should be restored, if at all. Perhaps the corrupt
politician or the dishonest lawyer should be deprived permanently of
certain rights. But the deprivation and restoration would be far more
64. FnoMm, ESCAPE FROM FREEDoM 270-71 (1961).
65. TAPPAN, CRIME, JusTinCE AND CoRmcTioN 429 (1960).
66. See discussion of this case at text accompanying note 36, supra.
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